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This article discusses two complementary themes that play an important role in 
contemporary South African political philosophy: (1) the racist tradition in Western 
philosophy; and (2) the role of ubuntu in regaining an authentic African identity, 
which was systematically suppressed during the colonial past and apartheid. These 
are also leading themes in Mogobe Ramose’s African Philosophy Through Ubuntu. 
The first part concentrates on John Locke. It discusses the thesis that the reprehensible 
racism of many founders of liberal political philosophy has lethally infected liberal 
theory. This view neglects the distinction between genesis and justification. Political 
liberalism has since cleansed itself of the prejudices of its spiritual ancestors. Liberal 
human rights exclude racism as a matter of principle. The second part discusses 
the claim that the ubuntu philosophy provides a better basis for a constitution in 
a modern society than political liberalism. A major problem is that ubuntu is an 
essentially contested concept. Some philosophers consider ubuntu to be a moribund 
notion (Matolino); others see it as a vital concept par excellence. In the latter case, 
it is elaborated from sundry incompatible political views, ranging from African 
nationalism (Ramose) via humanist communitarianism (Metz) to liberalism (Mboti). 
Conclusion: as an essentially contested ideological concept, ubuntu should not be 
a decisive constitutional standard for the application of state force. In contrast, the 
constitutional model of political liberalism provides a reasonable alternative, as it is 
designed precisely to solve the problem of social plurality and ideological contest.
African philosophy and Western racism
“Aristotle, Locke, Kant, Hume and Hegel…are among the great Western philosophers who made 
no small contribution to the philosophical racism in the West” writes the South African philosopher 
Mogobe Ramose in African Philosophy Through Ubuntu (Ramose 1999, 15). As a counterbalance to 
Western philosophical racism, Ramose formulates an authentic African philosophy based on ubuntu, 
the Bantu concept of humaneness.1 
In Ramose’s African philosophy, ubuntu plays a pivotal role: it demonstrates African rationality, 
and thus confirms an authentic African identity that was systematically suppressed during the 
colonial past and apartheid. Ramose’s philosophical agenda consists of two complementary 
elements: demolition of the Western hegemony and reconstruction of the African worldview and 
way of life. The latter does not imply a return to pre-colonial African society: the traditions serve as 
a source for the construction of an authentic model that is suitable for today’s Africa – and can also 
be attractive to the rest of the world. 
Inspired by Ramose’s call for a dialogue between the “radically opposed epistemological 
paradigms’ of the African and Western worlds” (1999, 134), this article discusses both aspects of 
1 Ubuntu plays an important role in post-apartheid South Africa. The term was used in the interim Constitution (1993) in order to anchor 
the policy of reconciliation in pre-colonial African traditions, and has since gained a prominent place in jurisprudence.
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Ramose’s philosophical programme: Western philosophical racism and African ubuntu philosophy.2 
First, I discuss the thesis that the racism of many founders of liberal political philosophy has lethally 
infected liberal theory as such. I object that this view neglects the distinction between genesis and 
justification, and that political liberalism has in the meantime cleansed itself of the prejudices of 
its spiritual ancestors.3 I then situate Ramose’s philosophy in the broad African ubuntu debate. I 
conclude by comparing the political elaboration of the ubuntu philosophy with political liberalism: 
which of these views is the best basis for a constitution in a modern society? As all conclusions are 
provisional, the result invites further dialogue.
Philosophical racism
According to Ramose, Western philosophy is permeated with racism. Aristotle formulated an 
essentialist definition of “man” as a rational animal; at the same time, he considered non-Greek 
“barbarians” to be irrational, and therefore naturally destined for slavery. This ancient doctrine was 
recycled in the early modern period to justify colonial slavery.
The philosophers of the Enlightenment built on this. They argued that all human beings, as rational 
persons, have a natural right to individual freedom. That is why all people must free themselves 
from physical and mental slavery; their rationality enables them to rise above religious superstition, 
irrational forms of government and oppressive power relations, in order to emancipate themselves 
as equal citizens. However, argues Ramose, the Enlightenment philosophers only had Western 
Europeans like themselves in mind. Being featherless bipeds, the indigenous Africans, Australians 
and Americans may have looked like people at first glance; but due to their alleged lack of rational 
capacities they were branded as sub-human. This served as a justification for colonialism and 
slavery: “On this basis, slavery, plunder, conquest in unjust wars as well as enforced ‘civilisation’ 
and ‘Christianisation’ became the rights of every human being outside and beyond the geographical 
boundaries of the West” (Ramose 2005, 17).
According to Ramose, Western philosophy played a decisive role in colonial oppression,
the philosophical character of the European colonization of Africa and other parts of the 
world was the urge to impose the European epistemological paradigm upon Africa and 
other colonized peoples of the world. This means that European colonization was intent 
upon establishing and maintaining in all the colonized parts of the world, the European 
conception of reality, knowledge and truth (Ramose 1999, 45).
The colonised had no right to think, speak and act independently. At best, they could imitate the 
Western way of life of the “conqueror”. Even after the abolition of slavery and after decolonisation, 
philosophical racism continued to have a dehumanising effect: “the posterity of the colonized 
continue to live under the burden of the conviction that the notion of ‘man being a rational animal’ did 
not mean the African” (Ramose 2001, 12). Hence the prejudice that Africa is incapable of producing 
knowledge, so that African philosophy seems inconceivable – Ramose calls this epistemicide. And 
hence the need for a “struggle for reason” in order to decolonise black consciousness: the path 
from mimesis to authenticity is hard as long as the oppressive Western “epistemological paradigm” 
reigns.
Ramose criticises the racism of Locke, Hume, Kant and Hegel.4 According to Kant, the motto 
of the Enlightenment is Dare to think for yourself! However, in writings such as Of the Different 
Races of Human Beings (1777) and On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy (1788), 
he assumed a hierarchy of four races, the colour of which coincides with a diminishing degree 
2 On 19 January 2018, I attended the inspiring presentation of the Dutch translation of Ramose’s book at the Amsterdam Public Library. I 
then wrote an earlier version of this article with the aim of introducing readers in the Netherlands to the broad ubuntu debate in Africa. It 
was presented as a paper at two symposia on Ubuntu in South Africa today with Mogobe Ramose at UWC (14 March 2019) and UNISA 
(27 March 2019). The concluding sections of the present article derive from the lively dialogue I had there with Ramose and others.
3 This section builds on Maris (2018a), chapters 2 and 8, as well as Maris (2018b).
4 Ramose discusses Hegel in detail. His criticism of the others is based on secondary sources, in the case of Locke on Bracken (1978).
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of rationality: white, yellow, black, red. The whites were the only race to possess all the talents. 
Amerindians and especially blacks were ideally suited to slavery.5
Kant built on Hume’s earlier assertion that Negroes lack talent. In a notorious note in Of National 
Characters (1748), Hume distinguished four human species; and Negroes are by nature inferior 
to whites. “There never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white, nor even any 
individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufactures amongst them, no 
arts, no sciences” (Hume 1974, 213). Admittedly, in Jamaica a learned Negro was spotted, but 
probably he only mastered some trick like a parrot that imitates a few words.6
As far as Locke is concerned, Ramose agrees with Bracken’s criticism (1978) that “Locke…is a 
pivotal figure in the development of modern racism in that he provides a model which permits us to 
count skin color as nominally essential property of men’ (Ramose 1999, 16; quotes Bracken 1978, 
243–244).
I concentrate on John Locke (1632-1704) regarding philosophical racism. First of all because 
I presented Locke as a main character in We want our freedom!, my play on slavery that was 
performed in Amsterdam (2013), Curaçao (2014) and Aruba (2015). Moreover, Locke composed his 
famous A Letter Concerning Toleration while he was in hiding in 1685 as a political refugee on the 
Keizersgracht in Amsterdam, just around the corner from my canal house on the Leliegracht. So, I 
follow his footsteps every day.
Unlike Hume and Kant, Locke never made explicit racist statements in his philosophical writings. 
However, despite his plea for liberal freedom rights, he considered slavery to be legitimate in 
exceptional circumstances. In addition, he was involved as a board member in various colonial 
institutions, and held shares in the Royal African Company, which had the monopoly of the English 
slave trade.7 Locke could have known better, because he was familiar with the misery of slave 
life. Moreover, a number of contemporaries pointed out the injustice of slavery (albeit a small 
minority). For example, Francis van den Enden, Spinoza’s Latin teacher, stated in his Free Political 
Propositions ([1665] 1992) that slavery does not belong in a free country, and that all peoples of 
the world are capable of self-government. But all this still does not prove that Locke was a racist. 
Indeed, scholars passionately disagree on this point.
Locke and slavery
Locke’s attitude towards colonial slavery was highly questionable, to say the least. On the one hand, 
he considered freedom to be a natural right to which all people are entitled. According to Locke, 
man is distinguished by his capacity to think independently (Locke 1979). Therefore no one is 
subordinate to anybody else; everybody should be free to design his life autonomously, as he sees fit 
(Locke 1988). The limit of one’s individual freedom is that one may not harm another person in his 
life, health, freedom and possessions (Locke 1988). According to the social contract, the state must 
guarantee each individual’s rights to these goods. 
This seems to exclude slavery. And indeed, Locke begins his Two Treatises of Government with 
the famous phrase:
SLAVERY is so vile and miserable an Estate of Man…that it is hardly to be conceived, that 
an Englishman, much less a Gentleman, should plead for’t (1988, 141; emphasis in original)
But in Of slavery, in chapter 4 of his Second Treatise, Locke argues that slavery can be legitimate 
in exceptional circumstances. Principally, he considers freedom to be an inalienable right that 
5 See also Eze (1997). Kleingeld (2007) argues, however, that in the last decade of the 18th century Kant improved his philosophical position 
in favour of a universalist view of human rationality and morality. Now, he considered slavery to be illegal. See also Flikschuh and Ypi 
(2014).
6 For an interpretation of the changes to this footnote that Hume made in the course of his life, see Garrett (2000). In a note below about 
Locke, we meet a rational parrot that has an elegant conversation with its Dutch interlocutors.
7 This ambiguity makes Locke an interesting stage character. In We want our freedom! he plays a leading role in a dramatic trial concerning 
the slave Virginia, who is tried for escape attempts in 1744. Her owner Vanderdendur, represented by his lawyer Jacobus Capitein (about 
whom more later), claims her as his legitimate property. Virginia, on the other hand, is demanding not only her personal freedom, but also 
the total abolition of slavery. Locke acts as her counsel – but, on closer inspection, is he not a pettifogger?
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cannot be completely waived precisely because it is characteristic of being human. Yet, following 
the example of Grotius and Roman law, Locke makes one exception: those who start a war of 
aggression and end up as captives may be made into slaves. After all, the aggressor has forfeited his 
claim to his natural rights by consciously opting for the state of war. His victor may therefore take 
his life; logically he may also let him live and use him as a slave (Locke 1988).
Locke did not address colonial slavery in his philosophical writings, either in an approving or in a 
disapproving sense. Unlike many of his contemporaries, he did not make any racist statements. But 
he held shares in the English slave trade. Moreover, in his capacity as secretary, he co-authored the 
Constitution of the American colony, Carolina. Article 101 reads: Every freeman of Carolina shall 
have absolute power and authority over his negro slaves.8
Against this background, it is not surprising that critics read the philosophical treatises that Locke 
wrote on his own authority as an implicit vindication of the racist colonial slave system. According 
to them, Locke’s justification of slavery was aimed at African-American slaves, while he reserved 
the liberties for Europeans.
According to this view, Locke would have meant “SLAVERY” in the abovementioned opening 
sentence of his Treatises in a purely metaphorical sense, as part of his criticism of the absolute 
monarchies in Europe. In such tyrannical states, the subjects are like slaves, since the monarch has 
deprived them of their natural right to freedom. Chapter 4 of the Second Treatise is said to refer to 
colonial slavery: Africans who are made captives in wars between Africans fulfil the conditions of 
legitimate slavery. The European slave traders are allowed to purchase them in order to sell them in 
the American colonies.
Other authors reject this interpretation. They point out that Locke restricted the criteria for 
legitimate slavery to such an extent that they did not cover colonial slavery. After all, most of the 
enslaved Africans were victims of ordinary raids. Furthermore, Locke explicitly stated that the 
innocent children of slaves are entitled to their natural rights to life and freedom – surely, they did 
not wage war. This excludes inherited slavery as in the colonies.
Moreover, Locke’s legitimate slavery is not tailored to Africans, but concerns all unjust warriors, 
including Europeans. Yet Locke is also under suspicion on this point. Bernasconi and Mann (2005) 
point out that this broad interpretation, taken literally, would have the consequence that slavery 
would have to be reintroduced into Europe. This seems so contrary to Locke’s view of a civilised 
constitutional state that, according to these critics, he must have tacitly assumed that (European) 
Christians cannot enslave each other. Consequently, his theory of slavery must have been intended 
exclusively for Negro slaves, to the exclusion of Europeans. Bernasconi and Mann assume an 
unspoken racism on the part of Locke, which would have made this dichotomy so self-evident to 
him that he did not feel the need to explicate it in so many words.
According to critics such as Davis (1966), Locke deliberately created an exceptional position 
for a category of individuals who lack natural rights because they have violated the rights of 
others: they fall outside the common Law of Reason and are therefore not protected by the social 
contract. According to Glausser (1990), this would also apply to the underdeveloped Africans and 
Amerindians who do not know how to make efficient use of their land and thus have no right of 
ownership over it. That is why Africa and America belong to the European settlers who are able 
to develop the country. If the indigenous people violently oppose colonial civilisation, they can 
legitimately be made into slaves.9
Ramose bases his indictment of Locke’s philosophical racism on Bracken’s more abstract 
epistemological argumentation. Bracken (1973; 1978) focuses on the nominalism of Locke’s 
empiricist theory of knowledge. Empiricism denies the existence of essences in reality, so that 
8 Furthermore, in 1672 Locke invested in the company Adventurers to Bahamas, which operated slave plantations in the Bahamas. From 
1696 to 1701, he was a board member of the English Board of Trade and Plantations.
9 Armitage (2004) quotes Second Treatise, §34: “God gave the World to Men in Common; but…it cannot be supposed he meant it should 
always remain common and uncultivated. He gave it to the Industrious and Rational” (Locke 1988, 191). In §45 Locke continues: “yet 
there are still Great Tracts of Ground to be found, which (the Inhabitants thereof not having joyned with the rest of Mankind, in the consent 
of the Use of their common Money) lie waste, and are more than the People, who dwell on it, do, or can make use of, and so still lie in 
common” (ibid., 299).
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general concepts are merely names. Therefore, the empiricist can compose generic concepts at 
will. He can define “man” (or “gold” or “parrot”) according to his own preferences by composing 
the concept with properties of his choice, for example “whiteness”. Bracken refers to Locke’s An 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding IV, vii, 16: a child who has only seen white Britons, 
argues Locke there, will attribute the quality of “white” to the idea of “man”. It can then logically 
demonstrate that a black person is by definition not a human being. Bracken acknowledges that an 
adult can reject the child’s understanding as naive. Nonetheless, he argues, in view of his nominalism 
Locke cannot disprove in principle that whiteness is a typical human characteristic (so that blacks 
are not part of humanity). “Indeed, there is no mechanism within the Lockean model to rule out 
counting skin color as the ‘essential’ property of men” (Bracken 1973, 244). In this way, concludes 
Bracken, Locke’s philosophy facilitated the rise of racism.
Waldron (2002a) interprets Locke’s passages about slavery more sympathetically than these 
radical critics, but also concludes that Locke had his fingers burnt. He adds that slavery runs counter 
to the ideal of equal freedom that charactarises the spirit of Locke’s work as a whole.
Considering all of this, I agree with the conclusion of Glausser (1990) that Locke’s attitude to 
slavery can be interpreted in three ways, all of which are defensible. According to the first view, 
expressed by Waldron and others, Locke’s chapter on slavery is an unfortunate deviation from his 
liberal political philosophy as a whole. A second view identifies a similar contradiction in Locke’s 
work, but sees this as a despicable attempt to justify his own interests in slavery. According to a 
third view, advocated by Marxists, Bracken (1973), Davis (1966) and Glausser himself, Locke’s 
passages on slavery are characteristic of his political philosophy in general. 
All these interpretations are critical. Whichever reading is the correct one, Farr rightly notes that 
“Locke’s silence about the Afro-American slave practices that he helped forward remains unsettling 
and poses some of the greatest problems for understanding Locke as a theorist and a political actor” 
(Farr 1986, 264).
Genesis and justification
What, then, about Ramose’s indictment of Locke as a philosophical racist, and the implicit assertion 
that liberal political philosophy is inherently racist? I share Ramose’s view that Locke’s position on 
slavery cannot be excused. But he is hasty in his definite choice of the radical view that Locke was a 
racist who wanted to justify colonial slavery. The same applies to the associated thesis that Locke’s 
errors affect liberal political philosophy as such.
Was Locke a racist? Bracken, on whose authority Ramose bases his verdict, does not make it 
sufficiently plausible that the third interpretation of Locke’s attitude to slavery is better than the 
other two. Bracken concedes that he only demonstrates that Locke’s theory of knowledge may 
facilitate racism, not that it is inherently racist (Bracken 1978). 
In itself, the conceptual openness of nominalism is neutral – Bracken only warns that it lends 
itself to manipulation by those in power.10 As we have seen, Aristotle’s competing epistemology 
and metaphysics, rationalism, can just as easily facilitate a racist view of man. Contrary to Locke, 
Aristotle assumed that there are essences in reality, that we can trace them through reason, and that 
a definition of a thing should describe its real essence. He defined man as an essentially rational 
being, therefore, irrational people, notably women and barbarians, are imperfectly human.
10 Is, then, Locke’s own liberal plea for natural human freedoms not based on conceptual arbitrariness? Not necessarily, argues Waldron 
(2002a). Waldron acknowledges that according to Locke’s theory of knowledge, “species” is only a conventional construction, so that 
“man” has no reference in the floating world (Locke 1979). But in empirical reality, people show sufficient similarities to attribute 
“corporeal rationality” to them, as Locke does (Locke 1979). Thus, human beings distinguish themselves from other animals by their 
rational capacities, and therefore have an equal right to freedom. Consequently, women and Africans are entitled to equal liberties as 
soon as it appears that their alleged irrationality is contrary to the observable facts. (But parrots are not. In his Essay II, xxvii, Locke 
mentions the story by Johan Maurits van Nassau, governor of Brazil, about a parrot that had an extensive conversation with him. Seeing 
the governor and his Dutch retinue, the parrot said, “What a company of white Men are here?” Suppose this story is true, says Locke, then 
the rationality of this parrot would not make the animal “human” yet. After all, being human is defined by a combination of characteristics. 
The corporeal rationality that the parrot shows is not “human” because his mind resides in a bird body. Indeed, a parrot is a feathered and 
winged biped. More about Locke’s rational parrot in Walmsley 1995).
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Bracken also recognises that his criticism does not show that Locke himself was a racist. He 
can only point at circumstantial evidence: Locke’s role as a board member of colonial institutions 
does point in that direction. However, in Locke’s defence it can be argued that his administrative 
work does not necessarily reflect an underlying racist ideology. His co-authorship of the Carolina 
Constitution may be excused as hackwork. After all, Locke never made any explicit racist statements 
in the philosophical works he wrote on his own authority.
It requires relatively artificial constructions to uncover the concealed racist intentions that critics 
suspect in Locke’s writings. If Locke thought non-Europeans were inferior, why did he not just say 
that out loud, just like Hume and Kant? If he had wanted to defend colonial slavery, why did he not 
do so in so many words? Perhaps because, as a civilised Englishman, he did not want to speak out 
openly in favour of it? Did he realise that slavery is, after all, incompatible with his fundamental 
ideal of freedom?
Is liberal political theory racist? According to critics such as Veraart (2017), the racism of Locke 
and other Enlightenment philosophers exemplifies that liberal philosophy as such is inherently 
racist:
I find it problematic that we are not talking more about the way in which this liberal theory 
has contributed to the structural inequality in the world that we still face today. We still 
think that our values are superior, that the world will be a better place if everyone adopts our 
Western ideas, but forgetting that the same theories led to enormous inequality (interview in 
Breedveld 2017, 12).
Early modern thinkers such as Locke “continued to divide the world into civilised people and 
barbarians, into cultural and natural peoples, into rational persons and brutes, into freemen and 
slaves” (Veraart 2017, 216). Veraart endorses the diagnosis of the social contract of Charles Mills 
(1997): in fact, it is a racial contract. After all, the theories of the social contract have “almost 
always worked to the advantage of the white man and to the detriment of the black man…” (Veraart 
2017, 230). The reference by liberal philosophers to freedom and equality is therefore pure rhetoric, 
says Veraart.
This conclusion is also a hasty one. It is undisputed that Locke’s errors are part of the colonial 
past, a dark side of Western history that still makes itself felt. But his mistakes do not in themselves 
affect liberal political philosophy – even if Locke was a racist in disguise. On the contrary, liberal 
human rights excludes slavery as a matter of principle; the underlying principles of freedom and 
equality cannot therefore be dismissed as mere rhetoric.
The thesis that Locke’s theoretical errors undermine liberal theory as such disregards the 
epistemological distinction between genesis and justification. Historical peculiarities in the genesis 
of a theory are irrelevant in the context of justification, which only concerns the strongest possible 
version of that theory. In other words, the discussion about the validity of liberal political philosophy 
follows its own argumentative logic, which leaves behind the personal mistakes of the theorists. 
The fact that Locke’s friend Newton combined his discovery of the laws of gravity with eccentric 
religious views and alchemy does not diminish the status of modern natural science.
Locke’s philosophy contains countless incongruities arising from prejudices prevailing at the 
time and from his position in society. His untenable defence of slavery is only one of them. Locke 
stated, for example, that morality loses all its authority without faith in God, and that religious 
freedom therefore does not apply to atheists. Furthermore, in Locke’s version of the social contract, 
the citizens do have individual freedom rights, but no social and political rights. His arguments in 
favour of this are nowadays considered untenable. This does not mean that the liberal principles 
of freedom and equality are merely rhetorical; on the contrary, correcting such inconsistencies has 
extended their scope.
This is evident from John Rawls’s contemporary version of the liberal social contract (1971): in 
a just state, all citizens are entitled to freedom rights, political participation rights and social rights. 
This implies complete tolerance and freedom of belief – after all, history has falsified Locke’s 
assumption that atheists threaten public order. Rawls comments on Locke and his contemporary 
Bayle: “More experience would presumably have convinced them that they were mistaken” 
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(Rawls 1999, 92). Slavery is not acceptable either: “Where the conception of justice as fairness 
applies, slavery is always unjust” (Rawls 1999, 67; emphasis in original). Indeed, slavery “violates 
principles that would be agreed to in the original position by the representatives of persons as free 
and equal” (Rawls 1996, 124).11 The liberal Universal Declaration of Human Rights also excludes 
slavery in Article 4: No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall 
be prohibited in all their forms.
It would be different if the discriminatory exclusion mechanisms that Ramose suspects in Locke’s 
theory were a necessary part of liberal political philosophy as such. But this is not the case. On the 
contrary, history has shown a development in which more and more members of groups that have 
traditionally been victims of social exclusion are recognised as equal subjects of law. This is partly 
because ideas have a relative autonomy in a conceptual “third world” (as Popper 1972 calls it). Once 
an idea such as human equality has been generally accepted, it acquires its own logical gravity: the 
burden of proof now rests on the party that wants to exclude certain categories of people.
This moral progress is promoted by learning from our experience. For a long time, women 
were excluded from study and public positions because they were supposed to lack the required 
intelligence. But as soon as they got the chance, they proved the opposite. Following this large-scale 
social experiment, no one can reasonably maintain that women are not eligible for study grants or 
the right to vote.
The same applies to the prejudice against Africans. This was already refuted by Jacobus Capitein 
– who was the model for Locke’s antagonist Capitein in my play We want our freedom!. The 
real Capitein was born in West Africa in 1717 with the name Asar. At the age of seven, Asar was 
enslaved by other Africans, who sold him to the Dutch merchant Van Goch. Van Goch renamed 
him Capitein and took the boy to the Netherlands, knowing that slaves would be released as soon 
as they landed there. In 1741, Capitein, as a free man, completed his theological studies at Leiden 
University with the dissertation Political-theological thesis to examine the question: Is slavery 
compatible with Christian freedom, or not?12 This was an exceptional performance: a former slave, 
raised in an illiterate environment, completed a dissertation in Latin at the age of 24.13
As soon as such prejudices are exposed, the basic liberal ideal of freedom and equality implies 
that the excluded group becomes a full participant in the social contract. Slavery still occurs, but, 
due to progressive insights, there is today hardly anyone who maintains that it is just in principle.14
Preliminary conclusion: Locke was wrong, but liberalism is not. Does this imply that “our values 
are superior, that the world will be a better place if everyone adopts our Western ideas” – an arrogant 
position that Veraart rightly rejects? No, it is impossible to call Western culture as a whole superior. 
After all, it is guilty of large-scale violence and oppression, as evidenced by colonialism, slavery, 
two World Wars and the atomic bomb. Nor can one call “our Western ideas” superior, for these also 
include Christian intolerance, fascism and communism. One can, however, defend the more modest 
11 Yet Rawls’s early writings echo Locke’s arguments for slavery in the case of prisoners of war, albeit in a light form that expressly excludes 
racist colonial slavery. Imagine city states, inhabited by free and equal citizens, used to killing each other’s prisoners of war. All citizens 
agree with a treaty stating that captives will henceforth be detained as slaves – even if they themselves would be taken prisoner of war. 
Such an institution of “contractual servitude”, being more humane than the previous situation, can be considered just, as long as slavery 
is not hereditary. Rawls hastens to add: “Of course, the historical forms of slavery have not satisfied these conditions” (Rawls 1963, 83). 
This argument returns in A Theory of Justice ([1971] 1973), but has been further restricted there to transitional stages to a completely 
liberal regime, on condition that slaves “are treated not too severely” (Rawls [1971] 1973, 284). It has disappeared in Political Liberalism 
(1993).
12 Capitein answered this question with a resounding yes – which is why he acts in We want our freedom! as a lawyer for the slave trader 
Vandendendur. After all, the Old and New Testaments endorse slavery in many passages. Thus, in his Letter to the Ephesians 6: 5–8, Paul 
preaches: “Slaves, obey your earthly masters with respect and fear, and with sincerity of heart, just as you would obey Christ” (Capitein 
2001, 132). Ramose will comment that Capitein’s way of thinking was completely westernised. Indeed, as an African ex-slave advocating 
slavery, Capitein’s character was at least as ambiguous as Locke’s, and was therefore another ideal model for a theatre personality. 
Disdainfully, Virginia calls him a coconut: black outide, white inside. Also see Kpobi 1993.
13 Similarly, Ramose’s career refutes the statement of the Belgian missionary Placide Temples, founder of African ethnophilosophy, that only 
a Westerner could have written his Bantu Philosophy ([1945] 1959). “We do not claim, of course, that the Bantu are capable of formulating 
a philosophical treatise, complete with an adequate vocabulary. It is our job to proceed to such systematic development” (Tempels 1959, 
36). 
14 Except in extreme fundamentalist circles, such as the Islamic State.
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thesis that liberal political philosophy is preferable to its competitors: a democratic constitutional 
state with its human rights is doing better than an absolute monarchy, a fascist dictatorship or a 
theocracy.
However, this thesis is controversial as well. Ramose, for example, considers the political 
morality of his ubuntu philosophy to be far superior. In his view, it provides an excellent basis for an 
alternative “indigenous philosophy of human rights”, based on respectful human relations (Ramose 
2017, 332). The ubuntu ideal also claims universal potential: even though it is based on ancient 
African traditions, it can “be attractive to the West and other parts of the world” (Haenen, in Ramose 
2017, 20). But this claim encounters its own problems: Ubuntu is an essentially contested concept 
in African political philosophy. Further dialogue is therefore necessary: what does ubuntu have in 
store for us?
Ubuntu
Ramose rejects liberal human rights as a form of Western imperialism, and writes that “[a]fter 
decolonisation, the Western will to dominate manifests itself in the name of ‘democratisation’, 
‘globalisation’ and ‘human rights’” (Ramose 1999, 3). According to Ramose, the human rights 
discourse does not make sense as long as it is not stripped of its liberal bias that alienates black 
Africans from their inalienable rights. Ramose refers in particular to their sovereign rights to South 
African territory. More generally, his communalist ubuntu ideal is incompatible with the liberal 
emphasis on individual rights.15
The Malawian philosopher Harvey Sindima even contends that “[t]he current value crisis among 
Africans is the result of the impact of liberal philosophy and discourse” (Sindima 1995, 27). 
Whereas liberalism gives priority to the individual and his rights, Sindima argues, African thinking 
abhors individualism (but not individuality). In the African view, people are interconnected in a 
web of life. “For the African, it is the respect for life and community that is a priority” (Sindima 
1990, 190). Sindima refers to Mbiti’s dictum: “I am because we are”. In his view, it is particularly 
the introduction of Western education in Africa that undermines African cultural values. Liberal 
education aims to cultivate a critical mind so that the pupil can discover his/her own personal 
identity, freed from full immersion into group life. Actually, says Sindima, this has a disruptive 
effect on young people: “Traditional practices and authority were ignored since they were founded 
on ignorance and superstition” (ibid., 193).
What, then, is the right course? Ramose contrasts the Cartesian I think, therefore I am of Western 
philosophy with the African “we think”. Ubuntu is central to this:
Ubuntu is the root of African philosophy. The be-ing of an African in the universe is 
inseparably anchored upon ubuntu. Similarly, the African tree of knowledge stems from 
ubuntu with which it is connected indivisibly. Ubuntu then is the wellspring flowing with 
African ontology and epistemology (Ramose 1999, 49).
This applies to all the indigenous peoples of sub-Saharan Africa. And because mankind has spread 
from Africa to the world, all people can be seen as brothers and sisters in a global ubuntu family: 
“precolonial Africa was both the heartland of philosophical rationality and is most probably the 
birthplace of homo sapiens” (Ramose 1999, 44).
The ubuntu ideal is often explained with the Bantu proverb umuntu ngumuntu nga bantu: a 
person depends on other persons to be a person. In the paraphrase of Ramose: to be a human being 
is to affirm one’s humanity by recognising the humanity of others and, on that basis, establish 
human relations with them. Ubuntu in a moral sense, then, is the process by which one becomes an 
ethical human being by promoting the cosmic balance in just and caring dependency relationships 
(Matolino and Kwindingwi 2013, with reference to Mkhize 2008, and Karenga 2004).
15 Ramose refers to Gyekye’s definition of communalism: “Communalism is the doctrine that the group constitutes the main focus of the 
lives of the individual members of that group, and that the extent of the individual’s involvement in the interests, aspirations, and welfare 
of the group is the measure of that individual’s worth. This philosophy is given insitutional expression in the social structures of African 
society” (Gyekye 1987, 208; Ramose 1999, 143).
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Ramose’s African philosophy embeds ubuntu ethics in an African ontology and epistemology 
(Also see Ramose 2003; 2004; 2015; 2016). According to African ontology, we live in a floating 
world of vital forces that dance along to the cadence of a rhythmic music of the spheres – a dynamic 
universe that cannot be captured in fixed analytical concepts. The African world has no separation 
between subject and object, body and mind, ratio and emotion, or thinking and acting. “For the 
Africans, the invitation of the dance of be-ing is indeclinable since it is understood as an ontological 
and epistemological imperative…To dance along with be-ing is to be attuned to be-ing” (Ramose 
2017, 59). 
The fact that Westerners are able to listen passively to Bach and Beethoven on a chair for hours is 
characteristic of the Western fragmentation of being. From a moral point of view, therefore, being 
human is not enough: one must become human by finding one’s place in the dynamic balance of 
“being becoming”, and in particular in community life.
An African community consists of both the living and the “living dead”, i.e. (in not entirely 
adequate Western terms) the spirits of the deceased ancestors, as well as those who have yet to be 
born. The ancestors protect the family community. “For this reason, it is imperative that the leader 
of the community, together with the elders of the community, must have good relations with their 
‘living-dead’” (Ramose 2017, 64). This is a necessary condition for peace and justice. “Thus, 
African religion, politics and law are based on and suffused with the experience and concept of 
cosmic harmony” (ibid., 64).
According to the African philosophy of life, the individual gets to know himself and the 
surrounding world through his community. He is therefore part of a larger whole. In order to reach 
the status of a person one has to go through a number of ceremonial rites of passage. As long as you 
have not yet been initiated into the community and its values, you are only an “it”.16 “In traditional 
African thought personhood is, therefore, acquired and not merely established by virtue of the fact 
of being human (We note in parenthesis that the contemporary discourse on human rights may not 
therefore be taken as a matter of course for Africans)” (Ramose 2017, 81). Even after his death, the 
initiated person remains closely associated with his community.
The African legal order is therefore permeated by ancestral religion, says Ramose. The authority 
of the law depends on the approval of the ancestors, who ensure that society maintains a just balance. 
When they have spoken, the living must obey their will unconditionally. Note that ancestors are only 
there for their extended family and have nothing to do with the community as a whole.
Ramose points out that this religious element in the African legal view is incompatible with the 
Western liberal democratic constitutional state. Indeed, the ancestors are above the constitution: 
“The living-dead are recognised as simply ‘higher”’ (Bewaji and Ramose 2003, 408). Since this is 
practised in large parts of Africa, Ramose finds it an urgent need to adapt the westernised legal order 
to the traditional African religion. 
Furthermore, the multi-party system of the Western model of democracy should be replaced by 
a consensual democracy that reflects Africa’s desire for harmony. The South African Bill of Rights 
must no longer serve as a touchstone for democratic decisions. “If we should be guided by the 
traditional principles of oneness, consensus and openness, and, I should like to add humility, then 
the day of the true liberation of Africa might not be too far away” (Ramose 1999, 145; emphasis in 
original).
The end of ubuntu?
However, the ubuntu ideal is controversial in African political philosophy. In The End of Ubuntu 
(2013), Bernard Matolino and Wenceslaus Kwindingwi argue that it is not viable as a political 
model. They see ubuntu as an outdated form of life that suited undifferentiated, small and close-knit 
communities: only there were the necessary feelings of solidarity able to flourish. Traditional 
community life is not only outdated, it also has major moral drawbacks because “such communities 
16 “Initiation involves circumcision in the case of males and clitoridectomy in the case of females. In both cases, blood is spilled and the 
spilling of blood in traditional African thought is associated with making of sacrifice” (Ramose 1999, 88). The blood stands for making a 
covenant with the community, which obliges the initiated persons to marry and conceive children in order to ensure the group’s survival.
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are notorious for their dislike for outsiders, intolerance towards divergent ideas and place a high 
price and value on blood relations in recognising the other” (Matolino and Kwindingwi 2013, 202).
Ubuntu would therefore be at odds with tolerance, democracy and cosmopolitanism. As a 
traditionalist “narrative of return” it is not suitable for complex, multicultural societies. It imposes an 
idealised African way of life, which prevents Africans from thinking independently and developing 
divergent ideas. Such a monolithic model is counterproductive, Matolino and Kwindingwi argue. 
Look at the earlier “narratives of return” of African “philosophers-kings”, such as Nkrumah, 
Senghor, Nyerere and Kaunda, which resulted in dictatorship and poverty. In short, away with 
ubuntu.
In “Just the beginning for ubuntu: reply to Matolino and Kwindingwi” (2014a), Thaddeus Metz 
reacts to this by stating that it is only now that academic research and the political application 
of ubuntu have got off to a good start. Metz (2007) himself constructs a contemporary ethical 
theory based on ubuntu, in which he abstracts much more from African traditions than Ramose. 
Metz emphasises that he does not engage in descriptive cultural anthropology, but in normative 
philosophy by means of the techniques of analytical philosophy. His purpose is “to refashion the 
interpretation of ubuntu so that its characteristic elements are construed in light of our best current 
understandings of what is morally right” (Metz 2014a, 536). Metz’s “Afro-communitarianism” 
differs from Ramose’s ubuntu on two important points: it removes the ancestors from ontology and 
adds individual human rights to ethics (but still on a communitarian basis).
According to Metz’s modernised version of the ubuntu ideal, human beings have dignity due 
to their capacity to live in a community. This capacity consists of two parts: first, the capacity to 
identify with others and share a way of life with them (identity); secondly, the capacity to take 
care of the quality of life of those others (solidarity). In this way, Metz brings system into African 
oral traditions in an academic way, by reducing them to a central principle that encompasses and 
explains the prevailing moral intuitions. The fundamental principle underlying Metz’s ubuntu 
ideal is friendship or love (characterised by solidary identity). According to Metz, this implies 
the typically African model of consensual democracy as well as individual human rights. Indeed, 
violations of human rights can be seen as unfriendly and are therefore immoral. Because Metz 
anchors human dignity and human rights in a general human capacity, they are not dependent on 
initiation into a specific community.
Metz (2010; 2011; 2014b) expounds his view on human rights. He understands human rights to 
include classical freedom rights, social rights and group rights (to one’s own culture, etc.). He bases 
them on the communitarian ideal of friendship, not on the liberal idea of individual autonomy. This 
seems to be an arduous combination, as Oyowe contends in Strange Bedfellows (2013). Yet, Metz 
argues against this: in a friendly community, individual negative freedom rights, such as the right 
to religious freedom and the right to private life, are quite conceivable. Violations of these rights 
are, after all, a gross form of unfriendliness, and thus infringe on the dignity of man as a communal 
being. “That is the compelling moral perspective that I find in the sub-Saharan tradition that differs 
from typical Western accounts of wrongness as…disrespect of an individual’s autonomy…” (Metz 
2014b, 310).
Ramose and Matolino strongly disagree with this. It will not come as a surprise that Ramose 
(2007) sharply criticises Metz’s modernist ubuntu interpretation. First of all, because Metz makes a 
caricature of ubuntu – Ramose speaks of “Metz’s vigorous battering upon a cadaverous caricature of 
ubuntu” (2007, 355). Secondly, because Metz’s reduction of ubuntu to the fundamental principle of 
friendship is unAfrican – Ramose speaks of “Metz’s search for an alien metaphysical Grundnorm to 
be implanted into the soil of Africa” (ibid.).
Matolino (2015) dismisses Metz’s interpretation as “ubuntu-talk” that is dogmatic rather than 
academic. Metz uses ubuntu for his own utopian political ideals; but if his theory is really “Metzian”, 
he must abandon any reference to the ubuntu tradition. This confirms the observation by Matolino 
and Kwindingwi (2013, 201) that “the notion of ubuntu has enjoyed such popular appeal that it can 
be said that it has become anything to anyone who so wishes to deploy it”.
Moreover, Matolino considers Metz’s Afro-communitarianism to be dangerous. Despite its 
embrace of human rights, it implies that the state incites citizens to a communalist way of life. After 
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all, Metz’s emphasis on consensus rests on the assumption of a general well-being that is based on 
an identity of interests in a shared form of life. The danger of this model is that it does not recognise 
fundamental antagonisms, which makes it difficult to solve them in a reasonable way. The younger 
generation of African philosophers, led by Emmanuel Eze, therefore opposes the consensual 
democracy as recommended by older philosophers, such as Ramose, Gyekye and Wiredu. Indeed, 
in practice it meant replacing colonial oppression with an oppressive one-party state. According to 
Matolino, Metz’s failing alternative therefore confirms the end of ubuntu.17
Jonathan Chimakonam (2016) stands up for Metz, at the expense of both Matolino and Ramose. 
According to Chimakonam (2016, 229), it is “the proper function of philosophers to employ the 
tool of logic in re-articulating pertinent worldview ideas at a higher level of understanding”. Such 
a forward-looking project around ubuntu has indeed only just begun. Metz gives it a good start by 
transforming the traditional African view into a modern philosophical system, says Chimakonam. 
Chimakonam does grant Matolino the honour of paving the way for this by criticising what 
Chimakonam calls analytical tribalism: the hitherto dominant defensive African philosophy that 
falls back on the past, such as ubuntu ontology. From now on, African philosophy can be practised 
in an open, conversational and critical way, without “struggle with the other”.
It does seem therefore that it is to Matolino and Kwindingwi that we now owe the gratitude 
of bringing African philosophy to ground zero where its questions may now be asked 
anew, afresh and in keeping with what Michael Eze calls “creative fidelity” (2010, 117) 
(Chimakonam 2016, 226).
May the real ubuntu stand up? 
Evidently, ubuntu is an essentially contested concept. This makes Nyasha Mboti (2015) sigh: May 
the Real Ubuntu Please Stand Up? He points to the research of Gade (2012) into the history of the 
interpretation of the concept. The first written reference dates from 1846, but it was not until 1993 
to 1995 that ubuntu was associated with the saying umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu (also see Samkange 
and Samkange 1980). This recent interpretation has now been institutionalised and is supported 
by opposites such as Ramose and Metz. Mboti, however, rejects this communalist interpretation 
as a dictate of the intellectual and political elite. In his view, both Ramose and Metz are violating 
Africa’s complex and rich reality.
Ramose’s holistic definition of ubuntu, argues Mboti, is based on a one-sided view of African 
life as determined by dependency relationships: “What if this normative view is completely wrong? 
What if African persons want to reserve to themselves the right to be ‘free’ with or without, and 
because of or despite, being in community with other Africans?” (Mboti 2015, 139).
The fact that Ramose links the status of “person” to initiation into a family community is 
unacceptable because it turns Africans into nonpersons and “its” (Mboti 2015, 138). On the other 
hand, Mboti considers Ramose’s ubuntu concept to be too vague because it does not sufficiently 
indicate what interdependence means. 
Metz offers more analytical precision: Ubuntu revolves around a shared identity that is based on 
friendship or love. However, Mboti objects, this “greatest harmony” principle leads to illegitimate 
coercion. Can disharmony or competition not be just as good? Memberships are often multiple and 
subject to constant change, in which case umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu should also refer to messier, 
undisciplined interpersonal relationships. This re-interpretation leads to an African conflict ethic 
that creates space for individuals to freely choose and shape their relationships. In other words,
[s]ubstantially, what do Africans want? Who can claim to know, decisively, what Africans 
want? What gives Africans – a people marked by the complexity, richness, and profundity of 
their differences – peace, happiness, and satisfaction? What if Africans simply want to live 
alongside other Africans and not through them? (Mboti 2015, 140; emphasis in original).
According to Mboti, Africans are therefore not bound by one particular moral code: “we are always 
17 For a discussion of “Limited Communitarianism”, the alternative by Matolino (2014), see Oyowe (2015).
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already a multiethnic people, involved in complex multiethnic interactions with others dependent 
on context” (Mboti 2015, 132). That is why ubuntu’s “greatest harmony” interpretation should be 
replaced by a version that recognises that every African is different and that Africans are people with 
and without a community.
Mboti concludes that the real ubuntu will not stand up. After all, no one can determine with 
certainty what African ethics entails. But that is no reason to abandon the ubuntu baby. Let her rather 
develop into a broad critical philosophy.
I suspect that ubuntu is really just another word for good African citizenship, an (impure) 
ethics of good citizenship based on independent thought and action, good sense, and 
informed choice in context (Mboti 2015, 144). 
Surveying the discussion, Leonhard Praeg (2017, 297) observes that “by thinking ubuntu we are 
implicitly doing politics”. After all, there is no objective point of view from which to assess which 
interpretation is true. Although African philosophy is epistemologically and ontologically suspect 
because of its essentialism, Praeg maintains, it is nevertheless politically necessary in the South 
African context as a performative act that creates a common identity. It is inevitable that tradition 
will thus be reinvented (and consequently distorted for political purposes).
Praeg distinguishes two ways in which ubuntu is constructed: traditionalist African 
communitarianism and modernist African humanism. Ramose will belong to the first category, Metz 
to the second (although he himself calls his theory “Afro-communitarianism”). Both visions have 
drawbacks, cautions Praeg.
African communitarianism is based on the traditional African ontology that places the individual 
in a hierarchical system that is ordered according to the principles of masculinity and seniority. 
Such a hierarchy implies coercion and violence, which is why feminists oppose the traditionalist 
ubuntu ideal.18 (Ramose will argue that he praises feminists as co-combatants. On the other hand, he 
seems to regard the senior male members of the family as the wise spokesmen of the authoritative 
ancestors.)
Conceived as humanism, ubuntu “becomes synecdoche for a whole rainbow of good news”, 
such as “harmony”, “friendship” and “love” (Praeg 2017, 295). “Ubuntu is sentimentally reduced 
to everything nice” (ibid., 298). Praeg says, “I freely admit that it is up to individual scholars who 
take their cue from the context they work in to decide between the two frames of humanism and 
communitarianism when they interpret ubuntu” (ibid., 296).
Ubuntu: an essentially contested concept
In African political philosophy, then, ubuntu appears to be an essentially contested concept. 
The meta-concept of essentially contested concept was coined by Gallie (1956a) to analyse the 
polysemic character of abstract, qualitative and evaluative notions, such as art, justice and humanity. 
To be essentially contested, Gallie maintains, a concept has to meet four criteria: (1) it should be 
evaluative; (2) complex, i.e. have various dimensions; (3) can be described and ordered in different 
ways; and (4) open to new developments. Yet, the conflicting interpretations are related in that they 
derive from traditional authoritative exemplars.19 Gallie adds that parties to the conceptual contest 
defend their interpretation as the only true one and attack their opponents for proclaiming false 
views. 
Waldron (2002b) has rephrased this as a distinction between concept and conception, as follows, 
18 For a feminist critique of ubuntu communitarianism, see Oyowe and Yurkivska (2014). In their view, the – largely male – ubuntu 
philosophers, such as Ramose, try to build an African identity on the basis of communal African values in the face of Western philosophy. 
In doing so, they do not sufficiently recognise that African traditions treat women unequally. Ubuntu philosophers tend to deny this, 
arguing that these traditions are egalitarian because men and women have an equal core (okra) in common, or because the sexes fulfil 
complementary but equivalent roles in society. Because of this, women would be entitled to equal respect. However, feminist critics 
object, the same philosophers link personhood to socialisation in the traditional community roles of a patriarchal society. At that level, the 
division of labour between men and women implies that they have asymmetric social functions linked to inequality in status, rights and 
economic prosperity.
19 On the problematic aspect of “exemplars”, see Collier, Hidalgo and Maciuceanu (2006).
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we imagine people advancing and defending (and criticizing and modifying) rival 
conceptions of the concept. Various conceptions might cite lists of attributes that stand in a 
“family-resemblance” relation to one another, and they might offer rival accounts of how the 
distinct attributes go together to make up the valued achievement that all the conceptions are 
trying to give an account of…Each conception is put forward as an attempt to outdo others 
in capturing an elusive sense, that we all share, a sense that somewhere in the midst of this 
contestation there is an important ideal that social and political systems should aspire to 
(Waldron 2002b, 150).
Although at a highly abstract and polysemic level agreement may exist on the exemplary meaning 
of an essentially contested concept (for instance, “justice” means treating like cases alike), it is 
interpreted in various reasonable yet incompatible ways. In other words, the concept can be 
elaborated into diverse conflicting conceptions that are all defensible.
In this sense, the concept of ubuntu is indeed essentially contestable. Its connotations range 
from its original manifestations in pre-colonial African traditions (that may be reconstructed by 
historical anthropology) to current trendy extensions into the global spheres of mindfulness and 
artificial intelligence. Within the context of political philosophy, too, ubuntu is the subject of intense 
academic contest. Some African philosophers consider ubuntu to be a moribund notion; others see 
it as a vital concept par excellence. In the latter case, ubuntu is elaborated from sundry incompatible 
political theories, ranging from African nationalism (Ramose) via humanist communitarianism 
(Metz) to liberalism (Mboti). 
Yet parties to the philosophical contest will object that the concept of ubuntu is contested but 
not essentially contested.20 After all, each of the contestants claims that his interpretation is the 
only true one. All contrary views would suffer from demonstrable errors, such as lack of academic 
rigour, reliance on inadequate literature, ignorance of relevant African traditions and languages, or 
downright immorality. This would imply that in the end a reasonable consensus could be reached 
on a correct interpretation of ubuntu, which can then serve as the basic constitutional principle for 
African nations, or even as a worldwide standard. 
What is one to make of this objection? It depends on the context. For sure, anthropological 
descriptions of the ubuntu tradition can be judged on their truth-value. In contrast, in political 
philosophy ubuntu figures as an evaluative concept that is open to competing reasonable 
interpretations. At a very abstract level, agreement may exist on its exemplary meaning: Ubuntu 
“stands for universalized humanness (ubuntu/botho) values, which are shared across cultures, and 
which include care, respect, tolerance, honesty, hospitality, compassion and empathy” (Koenane and 
Olatunji 2017, 263). Thus defined, the concept is internally complex and polysemic par excellence. 
It raises many questions that can lead to conflicting answers: Is ubuntu about compassion with 
humankind in general, or with specific groups, or with individuals? What is required to qualify as a 
subject of ubuntu? How does respect for the individual relate to caring for the community? And so 
on. This very broad concept allows for nationalist, communitarian and liberal conceptions, which 
confirms that “ubuntu” is essentially contested. 
Yet, it may be possible to eliminate some interpretations as improper in the domain of political 
philosophy. A first candidate for exclusion may be the liberal conception, along the following line 
of argument. One could argue that in the political context the core meaning of ubuntu includes an 
additional defining element: Ubuntu reflects an authentic African worldview. After all, the point 
of placing ubuntu in the centre of African political philosophy is to reinforce African identity in 
the face of Western imperialism. This broader core meaning may imply that the liberal conception 
should be rejected as an improper elaboration in the light of Africa’s traditional communalism, 
although as a persuasive definition it is a successful rhetorical move.21 Indeed, if the concept of 
ubuntu were open to such inversions of its original meaning, anything goes. 
20 Notably, because competing interpretations “can be shown, as a result of analysis or experiment, to be radically confused” (Gallie 1956a, 
180).
21 This disqualifies liberalism only as a member of the ubuntu family, not as a political position as such.
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Even if liberalism is eliminated, however, ubuntu still is an essentially contested concept. As Praeg 
points out, it is the stake of an ideological identity struggle between traditionalist and nationalist 
African communitarianism on the one side and modernist African humanism on the other side. 
Both conceptions take traditional African communalism as their starting point. According to Praeg, 
each may come with unwelcome consequences. The traditionalist conception may reinforce the 
suppressive tendencies of hierarchical traditions. The humanistic conception may degenerate into 
vague rosy notions such as “harmony”, “friendship” and “love”. 
Cannot Metz’s humanist interpretation of ubuntu be eliminated in a similar way as liberalism? 
After all, his opponents reject his Afro-communitarianism as unAfrican: they see it as an exasperating 
cultural appropriation of the authentic concept. Or, to put it in a friendlier way, Metzian humanist 
communitarianism might be rejected as an improper conception because it would be just the same 
without reference to ubuntu. Does this criticism hold? Koenane seems to take Metz seriously as an 
advocate of the communalist ubuntu ethic: 
This ethic of responsibility and care is well expressed by Metz as follows: An action is right 
just insofar as it is a way of living harmoniously or prizing communal relationships, ones in 
which people identify with each other and exhibit solidarity with one another (Metz 2009b, 
183) (Koenane 2017 and Olatunji, 5). 
Moreover, Metz’s communitarianism is Afro in that it endorses consensual democracy. Metz’s 
addition of human rights is based on the very same communalist ethic of responsibility and care. 
Ramose may object that Metz’s summary of ubuntu in the single basic principle of friendship 
violates the open character of African thinking: Ubuntu deteriorates into Metzianism. But Metz 
might reply that “friendship” itself is an open notion. In sum, Afro-communitarianism can be seen 
as a serious effort to update the tradition of African communalism that at least deserves the benefit 
of the doubt.
Still, it may be possible to eliminate some other interpretations of ubuntu as pointless in the 
political domain, especially at the extremes of the traditionalist and the humanist conceptions: 
extreme traditionalism descends into primitivism, extreme humanism degenerates into vague smooth 
talk. If ubuntu coincided with one of these views, its end as a vital concept in current political 
discourse would surely be imminent. 
As to the traditionalist extreme: a full return to pre-colonial traditions, also known as “primitivism” 
(Koenane and Olatunji 2017), is evidently impossible. This view can therefore be eliminated as 
pointless, but that does not help much, since no one is advocating a narrative of complete return. 
In this respect, the views of Ramose and Metz are not as far apart as they may seem. Both aim 
at reconstructing African traditions in the light of contemporary philosophy and the demands of 
present-day society. Ramose emphasises the dynamic character of the African worldview, which 
does not allow for conceptualisation in rigid “isms” and implies that customs change with the flow 
of time. His aim is not to return to an idealised past, but to restore the continuity of the African way 
of life that has been disrupted by Western imperialism. Metz also wants to update ubuntu, but in a 
more radical way.
This leaves us with a profound controversy in the ubuntu debate: to what extent should old 
traditions play a role in contemporary law and politics? Obviously Ramose endorses many elements 
of the ancient African traditions. Although it is not always clear where he is practising descriptive 
cultural anthropology and where normative philosophy, nowhere does he assume a critical distance 
from the customs he describes. His African philosophy through ubuntu explicitly applauds respect 
for the ancestors and the elderly, initiation into one’s community as a requirement for acquiring 
personhood, and the idea that law and justice are determined by supernatural forces (the living dead) 
and declared on their behalf by the living who are in authority.22 Metz’s conception of ubuntu, in 
contrast, is abstracted from these traditional elements, in an effort to transform and update African 
communalism into the more open ideal of friendship.
22 It is unclear whether Ramose would consider women as persons who have equal rights, or, more traditionally, as persons of equal worth 
but with different social roles and duties.
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Here we may arrive at the pointless antithesis of “primitivism”, namely the extreme of 
Afro-humanism: Ubuntu is in danger of degenerating into vague smooth talk. Critics of the 
humanistic conception contend that friendship is too vague to be meaningful in political philosophy. 
Metz, however, is not affected by this criticism, for he gives a further specification of friendship 
in terms of “solidary identity”. One may still object that Metz’s reasoning is rather loose, notably 
where he derives human rights from friendship. Indeed, one may maintain that violations of 
human rights are “unfriendly”, but one can just as well argue that appeals to individual rights are 
“unfriendly” since they disrupt social harmony. Moreover, Oyowe (2013) rightly objects that Metz 
presents no solution for conflicts between communal well-being and individual rights. But these are 
inadequacies that may be rectified. All in all, Metz’s Afro-communitarianism can be considered a 
meaningful (but not a better) extension of the core meaning of ubuntu, which confirms the thesis 
that ubuntu is an essentially contested concept.
In sum, in the South African political context some conceptions may be eliminated as improper 
extensions of ubuntu, notably the liberal inversion of the concept. However, this does not put an 
end to all the problems. The more ubuntu is limited to conceptions that are in keeping with the 
traditional all-inclusive African worldview and way of life, the more it excludes liberal Africans and 
citizens of Asian and European descent. In other words, conceptual curtailment reduces the contest 
within the concept, but the struggle continues in the extra-conceptual political debate. Moreover, 
essentially, ubuntu continues to be a contested concept.
Conclusion: Ubuntu versus political liberalism 
This conclusion does not usher in the end of ubuntu. The concept should continue to play a 
central role in discussions about African identity. It may also serve as a source of inspiration for 
political debate. However, an essentially contested ideological concept should not be a decisive 
constitutional standard for the application of state force. After all, one may reasonably disagree 
about its interpretation, so that is would be unreasonable to enforce one particular ideological view 
on all citizens. Therefore, ubuntu is not suitable as a basic principle for a constitution.
I should not leave it at this conclusion, otherwise I would be guilty of the same failure that 
Koenane finds worrisome in the work of Matolino and Kwindingwi: instead of presenting a 
preferable alternative to ubuntu, “they leave a vacuum, taking what appears to be the easy way out” 
(Koenane 2017 and Olatunji, 266). What could be the alternative?
This challenge brings us back to liberalism, particularly in the “light” version of political 
liberalism. Indeed, the constitutional model of political liberalism provides a reasonable alternative, 
as it is designed precisely to solve the problem of social plurality and ideological contest. It aims 
to deal with the central political problem of modern plural societies: how to cooperate on fair terms 
in spite of deep ideological controversies? (also see Maris 2018a). Moreover, this light version of 
liberalism may be acceptable to people who are attached to communal traditions because it does not 
start from individual autonomy.
In Political Liberalism (1996), John Rawls argues that in a modern open society inevitably a 
multitude of worldviews and life ideals will emerge about which we can reasonably disagree. It 
would be unreasonable to impose one of these views by means of state coercion. Therefore, the 
state should abstain from contested moral ideals concerning life as a whole. To find neutral common 
ground, political liberalism retreats to a meta-perspective. It does not present a view of the good life, 
but confines itself to the design of a fair constitution that enables cooperation between individuals 
with conflicting views of the good life. 
The solution is mutual tolerance: let’s agree to disagree. On the constitutional level, this requires 
a neutral state that does not impose any contested ideology or religion. Individual freedom rights 
guarantee a private domain in which each citizen can think and act as he prefers, as long as he 
respects the equal freedom of others. A just distribution of socio-economic goods (including 
restorative justice) guarantees that all have equal opportunities to make use of their liberties.
Political liberalism is less alien to the African communal way of life than its controversial cousin, 
“metaphysical” liberalism: it is not based upon the Western metaphysical ideal of individual 
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autonomy.23 Rawls agrees with communitarians that individuals do not enter society by their 
free choice. On the contrary, we “find ourselves growing up in this society and in this position” 
(Rawls 1996, 41). He only maintains that in a plural society, persons are not attached to fixed social 
roles and ideals of the good life. Since we can compare different ideals and ways of life, we are 
capable of revising our views on reasonable grounds. Therefore, individuals should be free from 
enforcement of particular perfectionist ideals. As indicated, political liberalism distances itself from 
all comprehensive metaphysical worldviews, including metaphysical liberalism, because these are 
all essentially contested. Instead, it restricts itself to providing a pragmatic solution to the political 
question: How can we coexist peacefully and on fair terms, despite our profound ideological 
conflicts?
Contrary to the argument of some communitarians, liberalism’s individual freedom does not end 
in selfishness or amorality. On the contrary, political liberalism presupposes cooperation on the 
basis of reciprocity and mutual respect. Individuals are committed to liberal virtues, such as respect 
for other people’s beliefs and property, solidarity with fellow citizens who cannot take care of 
themselves, and respect for democratic laws. Mutual respect and tolerance, then, are the preferable 
constitutional principles for modern open societies. And ubuntu? Ubuntu has no clear ending or 
beginning; it continues being an essential concept and way of life in the broader background culture.
References
Armitage, D. 2004. “John Locke, Carolina, and the Two Treatises of Government.” Political 
Theory 32 (5): 602–627. doi:10.1177/0090591704267122
Bernasconi, R., and A. M. Mann. 2005. “The Contradictions of Racism. Locke, Slavery, and the 
Two Treatises.” In: Race and Racism in Modern Philosophy, edited by A. Valls, 89–107. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press.
Bewaji, J. A., and M. B. Ramose. 2003. “The Bewaji, Van Binsbergen and Ramose debate on 
Ubuntu.” South African Journal of Philosophy 22 (4): 378–415. doi:10.4314/sajpem.
v22i4.31380
Bracken, H. M. 1973. “Essence, Accident, and Race.” Hermathena 1 (16): 81–96.
Bracken, H. M. 1978. “Philosophy and Racism.” Philosophia 8 (2-3): 241–260. doi:10.1007/
BF02379242
Capitein, J. E. J. 2001. “The Agony of Asar. A Thesis on Slavery by the Former Slave, Jacobus 
Elisa Johannes Capitein 1711-1746.”, Trans. with commentary by G. Parker. Princeton: Markus 
Wiener Publishers.
Chimakonam, J. O. 2016. “The end of ubuntu or its beginning in Matolino-Kwindingwi-Metz 
debate: An exercise in conversational philosophy.” South African Journal of Philosophy 35 (2): 
224–234. doi:10.1080/02580136.2016.1174921
Collier, D., F. D. Hidalgo, and A. O. Maciuceanu. 2006. “Essentially contested 
concepts: Debates and applications.” Journal of Political Ideologies 11 (3): 211–246. 
doi:10.1080/13569310600923782
Davis, D. B. 1966. The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
van den Enden, F. (1665) 1992. Vrije politieke stellingen. Amsterdam: Wereldbibliotheek.
Eze, E. C. 1997. “The Color of Reason: The Idea of ‘Race’ in Kant’s Anthropology.” In: 
Postcolonial African Philosophy. A Critical Reader, edited by E. Eze, 103–131. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Blackwell.
23 Locke’s political philosophy combines both strands of liberalism, which are nowadays conceived as two distinct ways of justifying a 
liberal constitution. Metaphysical is his foundation of freedom and tolerance on the assumption that God has created all human beings 
with the capacity for independent thinking. Locke’s secular arguments for toleration as the proper way to social peace and justice can be 
seen as an anticipation of political liberalism: “It is not the diversity of opinions (which cannot be avoided), but the refusal of toleration 
to those that are of different opinions (which might have been granted), that has produced all the bustles and wars that have been in 
the Christian world upon account of religion” (Locke 1991, 52). Both Locke’s secular arguments for toleration and Rawls’s political 
liberalism appeal to the historical lessons that Europeans have learned from the disastrous religious wars of the 16th and 17th centuries: it 
is better to pacify ideological conflicts through mutual tolerance.
Maris 324
Eze, M. O. 2010. Intellectual history in contemporary South Africa. New York: Palgrave and 
Macmillan. doi:10.1057/9780230109698
Farr, J. 1986. “‘So vile and miserable an estate’: The Problem of Slavery in Locke’s Political 
Thought.” Political Theory 14 (2): 263–289. doi:10.1177/0090591786014002005
Flikschuh, K., and L. Ypi, eds. 2014. Kant and Colonialism: Historical and Critical Perspectives. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669622.001.0001
Gade, C. B. N. 2012. “What is Ubuntu? Different Interpretations among South Africans of African 
Descent.” South African Journal of Philosophy 31 (3): 484–503. doi:10.1080/02580136.2012.10
751789
Gallie, W. B. 1956a. “Essentially Contested Concepts.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56 
(1): 167–198. doi:10.1093/aristotelian/56.1.167
Gallie, W. B. 1956b. “Art as an Essentially Contested Concept.” Philosophical Quarterly 6 (23): 
97–114. doi:10.2307/2217217
Garrett, A. 2000. “Hume’s Revised Racism Revisited.” Human Studies 26 (1): 171–177. 
doi:10.1353/hms.2011.0251
Glausser, W. 1990. “Three Approaches to Locke and the Slave Trade.” Journal of the History of 
Ideas 51 (2): 199–216. doi:10.2307/2709512
Gyekye, K. 1987. An Essay on African Philosophical Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Hume, D. (1748) 1974. “Of National Characters.” In: Essays, Moral, Political and Literary, edited 
by D. Hume, 202–220. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kant, I. (1777) 2007. “Of the Different Races of Human Beings.” In: Kant, Anthropology, History, 
and Education, edited by G. Zöller and R. B. Louden, 82–97. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Kant, I. (1788) 2007. “On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy.” In: Kant: 
Anthropology, History, and Education, edited by G. Zöller and R. B. Louden, 192–218. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Karenga, M. 2004. Maat, the Moral Ideal in Ancient Egypt: A Study in Classical African Ethics. 
New York: Routledge.
Kleingeld, P. 2007. “Kant’s Second Thoughts on Race.” Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229): 
573–592. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.498.x
Koenane, M. L. J., and C.-M. P. Olatunji. 2017. “‘Is it the end or just the beginning of ubuntu?’ 
Response to Matolino and Kwindingwi in view of Metz’s rebuttal.” South African Journal of 
Philosophy 36 (2): 263–277. doi:10.1080/02580136.2016.1225188
Kpobi, D. N. A. 1993. Mission in chains. The life, theology and ministry of the ex-slave 
Jacobus E.J. Capitein (1717-1747) with a translation of his major publications. Zoetermeer: 
Boekencentrum. 
Locke, J. (1669) 1801. “The Fundamental Constitution of Carolina.” In: The Works of John Locke 
in Ten Volumes, 175–199. London: J. Johnson.
Locke, J. (1690) 1979. An Essay concerning Human Understanding. Revised edition. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Locke, J. (1689) 1988. Two Treatises of Government. 3rd edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511810268
Locke, J. (1689) 1991. “A Letter Concerning Toleration.” In: John Locke, A Letter Concerning 
Toleration, in focus, edited by J. Horton and S. Mendus, 12–56. London: Routledge.
Maris, C. W. 2013. Wij verlangen onze vrijheid [We want our freedom!]. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij 
Duizend & Een.
Maris, C. W. 2018a. Tolerance: Experiments with Freedom in the Netherlands. Dordrecht: 
Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-89346-4
Maris, C. W. 2018b. “Niemand zal in slavernij gehouden worden. Mensenrechten, slavernij en 
Locke.” In: Fundamentele rechten in Curaçao, edited by M. Marchena-Slot, O. Kostrzewski, 
and L. Rogier, 100–114. Den Haag: Boom juridisch.
South African Journal of Philosophy 2020, 39(3): 308–326 325
Matolino, B. 2014. Personhood in African Philosophy. Pietermaritzburg: Cluster Publications.
Matolino, B. 2015. “A response to Metz’s reply on the end of Ubuntu.” South African Journal of 
Philosophy 34 (2): 214–225. doi:10.1080/02580136.2015.1035857
Matolino, B., and W. Kwindingwi. 2013. “The end of Ubuntu.” South African Journal of 
Philosophy 32 (2): 197–205. doi:10.1080/02580136.2013.817637
Mbiti, J. S. 1970. Concepts of God in Africa. London: SPCK. 
Mboti, N. 2015. “May the Real Ubuntu Please Stand Up?” Journal of Medical Ethics 30 (2): 
125–147. doi:10.1080/23736992.2015.1020380
Metz, T. 2007. “Toward an African moral theory.” Journal of Political Philosophy 15 (3): 
321–341. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9760.2007.00280.x
Metz, T. 2010. “Human Dignity, Capital Punishment, and an African Moral Theory: 
Toward a New Philosophy of Human Rights.” Journal of Human Rights 9 (1): 81–99. 
doi:10.1080/14754830903530300
Metz, T. 2011. “Ubuntu as a moral theory and human rights in South Africa.” African Human 
Rights Law Journal 11: 532–559.
Metz, T. 2014a. “Just the beginning for ubuntu: Reply to Matolino and Kwindingwi.” South 
African Journal of Philosophy 33 (1): 65–72. doi:10.1080/02580136.2014.892680
Metz, T. 2014b. “African Values and Human Rights as Two Sides of the Same Coin: A Reply to 
Oyowe.” African Human Rights Law Journal 14: 306–321.
Mills, C. W. 1997. The Racial Contract. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Mkhize, N. 2008. “Ubuntu and harmony: an African approach to morality and ethics.” In: 
Persons in Community: African Ethics in a Global Culture, edited by R. Nicholson, 35–44. 
Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.
Oyowe, A. O. 2013. “Strange bedfellows: Rethinking ubuntu and human rights in South Africa.” 
African Human Rights Law Journal 13: 104–124.
Oyowe, A. O. 2015. “This thing called communitarianism: A critical review of Matolino’s 
Personhood in African Philosophy.” South African Journal of Philosophy 34 (4): 504–515. 
doi:10.1080/02580136.2015.1104794
Oyowe, A. O., and O. Yurkivska. 2014. “Can a communitarian concept of African personhood be 
both relational and gender-neutral?” South African Journal of Philosophy 33 (1): 85–99. doi:10.
1080/02580136.2014.892682
Popper, K. 1972. Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Praeg, L. 2017. “Essential building blocks of the Ubuntu debate; or: I write what I must.” South 
African Journal of Philosophy 36 (2): 292–304. doi:10.1080/02580136.2016.1261442
Ramose, M. 1999. African Philosophy through Ubuntu. Harare: Mond Books.
Ramose, M. 2001. “An African perspective on justice and race.” https://them.polylog.org/3/frm-en.
htm
Ramose, M. 2003. “I doubt, therefore African philosophy exists.” South African Journal of 
Philosophy 22 (2): 113–127. doi:10.4314/sajpem.v22i2.31364
Ramose, M. 2004. “In Search of an African Philosophy of Education.” South African Journal of 
Higher Education 18 (3): 138–160.
Ramose, M. 2005. African Philosophy through Ubuntu. Revised edition. Harare: Mond Books.
Ramose, M. 2007. “But Hans Kelsen was not born in Africa: A reply to Thaddeus Metz.” South 
African Journal of Philosophy 26 (4): 347–355. doi:10.4314/sajpem.v26i4.31492
Ramose, M. 2015. “On the contested meaning of ‘philosophy’.” South African Journal of 
Philosophy 34 (4): 551–558. doi:10.1080/02580136.2015.1124509
Ramose, M. 2016. “Teacher and student with a critical pan-epistemic orientation: An ethical 
necessity for Africanising the educational curriculum in Africa.” South African Journal of 
Philosophy 35 (4): 546–555. doi:10.1080/02580136.2016.1247248
Ramose, M. 2017. Ubuntu. Stroom van het bestaan als levensfilosofie. Utrecht: Ten Have.
Maris 326
Rawls, J. 1963. “Constitutional Liberty and the Concept of Justice.” In: Rawls, J. 1999, Collected 
Papers, 73–95. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Rawls, J. (1971) 1973. A theory of justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rawls, J. 1996. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.
Rawls, J. 1999. Collected Papers. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Samkange, S. J. T., and T. M. Samkange. 1980. Hunhuism or ubuntuism: A Zimbabwe indigenous 
political philosophy. Salisbury: Graham Pub.
Sindima, H. 1990. “Liberalism and African Culture.” Journal of Black Studies 21 (2): 190–209. 
doi:10.1177/002193479002100205
Sindima, H. 1995. Africa’s Agenda: The Legacy of Liberalism and Colonialism in the Crisis of 
African Values. Westport: Greenwood Press.
Tempels, P. (1945) 1959. Bantu philosophy, Trans. C. King. Paris: Présence Africaine.
Veraart, W. 2017. “Het slavernijverleden van John Locke. Naar een minder wit curriculum?” In: 
Homo Duplex. De dualiteit van de mens in recht, filosofie en sociologie, edited by B. van Beers 
and I. van Domselaar, 215–237. Den Haag: Boom juridisch.
Waldron, J. 2002a. God, Locke, and Equality. Christian Foundations in Locke’s Political Thought. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511613920
Waldron, J. 2002b. “Is the rule of law an essentially contested concept (in Florida)?” Law and 
Philosophy 21: 137–164.
Walmsley, P. 1995. “Prince Maurice’s rational parrot: Civil discourse in Locke’s Essay.” 
Eighteenth-Century Studies 28 (4): 413–425.
Received 11 August 2019, revised 06 May 2020, accepted 16 June 2020
